

Scabbing the Palouse: agricultural labor replacement and union busting in southeast Washington, 1917–1919

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The radical ideologies and socialist overtones of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) made them an easy target for industrialists as nationalistic and patriotic propaganda flooded the pages of American newspapers during World War I. The war in Europe marked the beginning of the end for the rapid growth and labor organizing power of the IWW, especially in the northwestern United States where WWI was used as a means for state governments and regional industrialists to devise methods meant to damage the union beyond repair. After America's declaration of war, the Washington State Council of Defense was formed in response to the nation's demand for mobilization of its citizens for increased production of war materiel and to operate the state's wartime propaganda machine. With an abundance of natural resources, Washington had a profound impact on national war production output. Although it possessed several important extractive industries, it was Washington's quality grain, especially in the southeast portion of the state known as the Palouse, which made it a boon for agricultural industrialists. With wheat prices fixed at the highest in the nation's history, Palouse farmers became wealthy as a result of WWI, while the area's thousands of migrant laborers suffered from low wages and pitiful job conditions. A general strike issued during the 1917 harvest by the IWW's most influential branch – the Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (AWIU) frightened area farmers, prompting the Defense Council to begin a systematic replacement of AWIU harvest hands via the organization of thousands of women, children, and retirees. Through appeals to patriotism and anti-labor rhetoric, the Defense Council and local reactionaries effectively circumvented union labor with its labor replacement campaign throughout the remainder of WWI, and without the use of violence so common to labor conflicts in Washington State. The IWW/AWIU in the Palouse never fully recovered from the onslaught, thus adding to the union's near collapse in the aftermath of WWI.

Keywords: Industrial Workers of the World; Washington State Council of Defense; Washington State College; Agricultural Workers Industrial Union; migrant workers; Palouse

1. Domestic Wartime Hysteria: The Industrial Workers of the World, and the Defense Councils

Although their victories often came at a heavy price, the self-proclaimed anarcho-syndicalist union – the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, or “Wobblies”), had by 1917 gained a solid foothold in Western American labor organization. With the belief that the working class will never know emancipation from wage slavery unless the

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workers themselves facilitated a general strike, wrested control of the mode of production and “abolished the wage system,” the IWW, from its formation in 1905, became the favorite target for the ire of industrialists wherever the union made an appearance. Capitalists and local government authorities often responded to the IWW’s tactics of non-violent civil disobedience and relentless organization of the West’s massive “unskilled” migrant labor force with violence and mass arrests. Even with the legal and physical onslaught brought down upon both Wobbly leadership and its rank-and-file membership, the capitalist class seemed to be fighting a losing battle against the development of radical labor agitation. Highly publicized and politicized events, such as the Free Speech Fights of 1909–1910, the Ludlow Massacre of 1914, and the Everett Massacre in 1916 helped turn public opinion in favor of the IWW and against the increasingly heavy-handed tactics of company employed and government-sponsored strikebreakers. Early in 1917, Wobbly popularity was on the rise, but America’s entry into World War I in June 1917, brought forth newly devised methods of union-breaking that successfully destroyed the IWW in certain regions of the country. At the forefront of the national anti-IWW crusade during WWI stood the National Council of Defense, while in the Northwest, a region where industrial agriculture and timber harvesting were crucial to a successful prosecution of the war effort, the Washington State Council of Defense led the charge against wartime labor agitation.¹

US Congress established the National Council of Defense in August 1916, to organize every facet of society and industry that would be needed for wartime production in both the private and public sectors (the US declared war with Germany eight months later). With the federal government already expending a glut of resources into America’s WWI activity, the National Council of Defense was created around the notion that individual states would be responsible for mobilizing their citizens for a wartime economy with as little help from the federal government as possible. The National Defense Council essentially laid the foundation by proscribing guidelines, from which individual states created and organized their own defense councils. Each State Defense Council was established by state governors who appointed members, formed committees, and divvied out responsibilities accordingly. In order to ensure a successful mobilization of war-related production within Washington State, Governor Ernest Lister formed the Washington State Council of Defense on 16 June 1917. Governor Lister described the Defense Council as an “agency within the state to take charge of and properly direct war activities, under the direction of the National Council.” In Washington State, the most immediate concern was mobilizing labor for food production, specifically wheat harvesting. The labor question in Washington revolved around both wartime scarcity and the suppression of any agitation efforts by radical labor organizations, namely the IWW and its agricultural labor branch – the Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (AWIU). Although food production in general increased, wheat held the most economic significance, and southeastern Washington was one of the nation’s most important regions for production of the golden grain.²

Made famous for organizing activity in the mines and lumber camps of the West, the IWW also focused much of their organizing efforts on the tens of thousands of itinerant harvest laborers throughout the West with the AWIU branch. Prior to the AWIU’s formation in 1915, the IWW’s organizing drives of migrant harvest laborers (under the banner of the Agricultural Workers Organization, or AWO) suffered somewhat due to a more concentrated focus on the organization of the Northwest’s timber harvesters. With the introduction of the industry-specific AWIU #110, the IWW’s rank and file increased exponentially as the union focused more organizing “drives” within the harvest labor

professions. In October 1915, four months after its formation, the AWIU initiated approximately 2000 members, but in a testament to its influence and rapid popularity the IWW's newest branch initiated over 5000 new members by June 1916. From 1915 to 1917, nearly all new members initiated into the IWW joined the organization through the AWIU branch which expanded to over 20,000 members by 1917. In the Palouse alone, there were an estimated 2500 rank-and-file members working as itinerant harvest laborers during any given harvest season, and who vigorously agitated for increased wages and improved working conditions.³

The formation of the AWIU coincided almost perfectly with America's military involvement in WWI and the wave of domestic wartime patriotism and paranoia that followed. The need to keep labor behind the war effort forced the government to tolerate strikes from the recognized, "traditional" labor union movement, but as historian William Preston Jr. states, "there was no such sympathetic flexibility for the labor radicals," such as the IWW.⁴ Unlike the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the IWW refused to abandon their right to strike as a bargaining tool, and this lack of conformity further antagonized the "master class" who intended on profiting from the production of war materiel. AFL head Samuel Gompers feared the expanding popularity of the IWW. He stated that the real purpose of industrial unionism was to "divert, pervert, and disrupt the labor movement in order to promote socialism."⁵ There was widespread fear of, and persistent reports about, IWW sabotage throughout the Western United States, although none of the claims were ever substantiated.⁶

The Palouse farming region of Eastern Washington encompassed an area of 1,700,000 acres of farmland in 1917. Farmers harvested a variety of crops, such as fruit, beets, and lentils, but it was the 450,000 acres of wheat that controlled the agricultural economy of the area. In order to increase the production of grain, the federal government fixed the price of wheat to entice farmers into growing as much as possible in the years before and during WWI. Historian Andrew Duffin explains that, "The high commodity prices of 1914–1919 encouraged farmers to plant every available acre in order to cash in on the misfortunes of European farmers and to contribute to the American war effort." Before the outbreak of WWI, Palouse-grown wheat sold at an average of 75 cents per bushel, but by 1916, that cost rose to an average of \$2.20 per bushel, an astonishing price for grain during that time.⁷

The high, fixed market prices meant substantial profits for Palouse farmers, but the low wages of the migrant agricultural laborers that harvested the grain remained stagnant, and the AWIU agitated for better wages and less hours. During WWI, AWIU farm hands and organizers demanded anywhere from \$3.00 to \$6.00 for a maximum 10-h day, opposed to the average farm labor wages of \$1.00–\$2.00 for upwards to 16-h shifts during harvest. Before WWI, AWIU agitation efforts in the Palouse were considered, by the state government, to be local matters dealt with by local jurisdictions. With the inability of many small towns to "curb the flow of the IWW," during the harvest season, the Washington State Defense Council worked in collusion with local governments to remove IWW influence from the agricultural labor force. Because of the region's importance for grain production, the Palouse suddenly became a political and labor battleground. Wheat was so vital for the war effort that Governor Lister considered it to be "of the utmost importance to winning the war." Charles Heberd, head of the Defense Council's Food Supply Committee (and Washington State's Agriculture Commissioner), said that "ensuring the grain supply was probably the most important of the Defense Council's work." Consequently, throughout WWI, the Defense Council

activities in the Palouse were focused on the stimulation of wheat production, as well as the procurement of the labor necessary to harvest the grain.⁸

The story of the Wobblies has routinely been a dramatic one. The American class struggle during the first quarter of the twentieth century was defined by unrestrained actions on both sides of the labor fight including assassination, mob violence, bombings, and political intrigue, but when it came to anti-IWW violence and suppression, no other state in the nation had a worse record than Washington. The Free Speech Fights in Spokane (1909–1910) led to the arbitrary arrests of hundreds of Wobblies, two of whom died as a result of their maltreatment while jailed for “soapbox orations.” The 1916 Everett Massacre occurred after a ship carrying rank-and-file Wobblies into Everett, WA was fired upon by a mob of deputized vigilantes, leaving five Wobblies and two “citizen deputies” dead. Events such as these highlight the type of violent harassment the IWW faced in Washington State. But in the Palouse, where the AWIU relentlessly organized the harvest labor force, different methods of suppression were used in which violence was not a part. In a region where thousands of AWIU “Harvest Wobblies” labored for America’s most important war commodity – wheat, the story of the class struggle was dramatic in a different way, and the IWW drama in the Palouse occurred as a result of what the union *could not* accomplish. Preemptive raids at the Spokane headquarters (the regional hub of IWW activity) and arrests of AWIU leadership by state and local officials obstructed the efforts of the union to successfully campaign for their members. Migrant laborers were pushed out of the harvest fields as Defense Council officials simultaneously recruited retired farmers, women, and children for harvest labor, which, combined with the raids, proved an effective union-breaking tactic.⁹

IWW historiography maintains that the organization buckled as a result of in-fighting among the group’s leadership, along with intense suppression by the federal government. Although merited, these aspects fail to give proper recognition to scab labor mobilization, which played a mitigating role in the IWW’s near collapse. Utilizing the labor power of non-union workers as a means to break unions is an often used, yet rarely discoursed method of union busting history, as well as the methods undertaken in procuring replacement labor. Perhaps the largest omission from previous IWW research has been that of the National and State Defense Councils, which were perhaps the most effective anti-Wobbly force, especially in Washington State. When the IWW threatened a general strike in the Palouse wheat fields during WWI, the Defense Council traded the threat of physical violence for intensified nationalist rhetoric and patriotic volunteerism as a means to “rid the Palouse wheat fields of that troublesome element – the IWWs” permanently. By and large, the threat of physical violence rarely deterred Wobbly organizers, but the Defense Council’s attempts to break the union in a non-violent manner proved to cause irrevocable damage to the union, especially in the Palouse where the AWIU never fully recovered from the WWI replacement campaign.¹⁰

The counter-organization and labor replacement/scabbing operation began during the summer harvest of 1917, two months after America entered WWI. It started simply to find temporary farm labor for the wartime harvests as tens of thousands of men were drafted into the conflict, which, to a very limited degree, thinned-out the Northwest’s agricultural workforce. Although some “Harvest Wobblies” registered and conscripted, most avoided the draft because they did not believe the working class should be fighting a “war of imperialism.” Those men, numbered in the thousands, agitated for better pay and 10-h workdays, hoping to use wartime labor scarcity as leverage. As opposed to the “skull-cracking” tactics synonymous with anti-radical intimidation of the era, the

Defense Council in collusion with regional business interests succeeded in converting the rising tide of nationalistic fervor and WWI jingoism into a weapon against the IWW. Declared traitors, slackers, and even German sympathizers by the press, business interests, and reactionaries at every level of government, the Wobblies were squeezed out of the Palouse and replaced with government-organized harvest laborers induced to work as “patriotic volunteers” in a complex case of government-organized farm labor scabbing.¹¹

2. 1917: “Let our Answer be the Call for a General Strike”

James Rowan was head of the Lumber Worker’s Industrial Union and Secretary-Treasurer of the Spokane region IWW. His position gave him a considerable amount of organizational control of all regional IWW branches, including the AWIU. In response to the arrests of the IWW’s General Executive Board (GEB) at the Chicago headquarters on 4 August 1917, Rowan issued a general strike threat, which he sent via telegraph to the governors of Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana on 13 August 1917. Earlier that month, IWW locals “overwhelmingly approved” the action by vote, declaring that if the states in question refused to release the incarcerated GEB members, a general strike would be called in all Northwest industries on 20 August. Although there were a number of itinerant workers drafted into the war, there still remained a strong presence of migrant AWIU members in the region’s harvest fields, and their labor was needed to bring in Washington’s first wartime grain harvest.¹²

In his telegraph to Washington State Governor Ernest Lister, Rowan stated:

Have been instructed to inform you that it has been decided by an overwhelming majority of men the on job to call a general strike in the harvest fields, fruit orchards and all construction work in the Northwest if all IWW prisoners are not released before August 20.

The strike bulletin handed out to workers earlier in August was more descriptive about the union’s demands, and eluded to the union’s suppression since the beginning of the war. The bulletin stated:

If these men and all other members are not turned loose by the 20th, let our answer be a general strike of all men employed in the harvest fields and the fruit orchards of these states. Let the harvest go to waste, and the fruit rot on the ground. If the laws of this country ... are set aside for a gang of profit hungry pirates, then we will have recourse to the court of the working class.

The bulletin also demanded the initiation of a standard 10-h workday in the harvest fields, instead of the 14–16 h days they were accustomed to. Rowan cherished his reputation as an agitator. He was described as a skinny and “swarthy” man with an air of “taciturn silence” about him, but who spoke readily and well. His intelligence was apparent, but his self-assuredness outweighed his judgment as the Defense Council’s net soon came down upon him.¹³

In direct response to Rowan’s general strike threat, Governor Lister declared martial law on 19 August 1917, and ordered the military occupation of downtown Spokane by federal troops. Two companies of Idaho [National] Guardsmen completely surrounded IWW headquarters – the Worker’s Hall. While James Rowan was on the Worker’s Hall telephone, Major Clement Wilkins accompanied by a group of US Marshal Deputies entered the building and arrested him without incident, along with William Moran, Nils Madison, and twenty-four other organizers and strike committee members. While in custody, Rowan told reporters that, “The principle object of the strike is for the 8-h

day: also sanitary conditions in the camps.” The raid was such a blatant violation of civil rights that both the Spokane County Commissioners’ office and the city’s prosecuting attorney refused to support the action. In a rare show of solidarity, the AFL-affiliated Spokane Labor Council denounced the unconstitutionality of the raids and demanded that Governor Lister release the prisoners.¹⁴

After they were marched to the Spokane County jail, the detainees were informed by Major Wilkins that they were military prisoners, “not detained under civil law.” Reminiscent of the Free Speech Fights eight years prior, Wilkins ordered the cessation of all street-speaking in Spokane. In order to ensure that no soapbox orations occurred, Wilkins stationed 16 privates to patrol near IWW headquarters. The military intrusion and subsequent isolation of regional IWW leadership was essential in stopping the general strike, but even more critical was in how Governor Lister organized against agitation in the Palouse harvest fields to counteract and preempt the harvest worker’s strike. In hindsight, James Rowan’s overconfidence dwarfed the union’s capability to organize for a general strike, and he also gave Governor Lister a week’s head start to prepare against the strike.¹⁵

Immediately after receiving Rowan’s 13 August telegraph, Governor Lister contacted Dr Henry Suzzallo, president of the Defense Council; A.L. Rogers, head of the Farm Labor Committee; and Charles Hebbard, Food Supply Committee chairman. The three committee heads were instructed by Lister to work directly with Washington State Agricultural College (WSC) in Pullman to organize against the general strike and to “rescue” the harvest. WSC president Ernest Holland proved an indispensable resource for the Defense Council’s counter-organization plans and helped to secure replacement workers for the proposed Northwest harvest strike. In an urgent 16 August telegraph, Governor Lister asked President Holland to “organize men in the fields, ensure a general feeling of patriotism, and make public and personal appeals to agricultural workers to stay on jobs.”¹⁶ Holland mobilized WSC employees and volunteers throughout the Palouse who, by virtue of their professions, were already in contact with hundreds of area farmers, and the regional agribusiness community, including the Spokane and Colfax Chambers of Commerce. Through “public appeals to patriotism,” the Defense Council and Washington State College begged the assistance of the “patriotic workers of the Inland Empire to rally ‘round the harvest.’”¹⁷

WSC’s Agricultural Extension Service also helped President Holland organize farm labor for the possibility of a general strike. The Extension Service (a food production partnership of the US Department of Agriculture and state land grant colleges, including WSC) is deeply rooted in Palouse farming culture and occasionally helped secure labor for area farmers before WWI (along with assisting in many other aspects of food production, such as seeding, soil experiments, etc.). By applying scientific knowledge to industrialized agriculture, the Extension Service conducted investigations and research of farming and environmental conditions in the region, striving to increase yields by improving farming methods. It endeavored to be of direct service by interpreting and demonstrating the results of its research and presenting it to agriculturists as a public service of Washington to promote the state’s agribusiness sector. According to college officials, the Extension Service aided Washington farmers in “solving their own problems of farming ... it helps them to help themselves.” The fieldwork essential to Extension Service success was performed by “county agricultural agents.”¹⁸

Agricultural agents exposed farmers to new farming techniques and encouraged the implementation of agricultural science to help improve the quality and quantity of their crops. In times of crisis, such as the WWI food production emergency, agents also

confronted issues regarding farm labor. They were employed by three separate government agencies: the USDA, Whitman County, and Washington State College, giving them extensive connections to various labor sources. Agricultural agents from Spokane and Whitman Counties became directly involved in the strike preparation campaign at the request of President Holland who asked them to speak with area farmers and workers. Both Dr Holland and Governor Lister ordered agents to begin a “backfire appeal to men to stay on the job” to prevent the general strike from gaining momentum.¹⁹

J.P. Perkins, a volunteer Extension Service speaker, offered to “reach-out” to the communities of the Palouse to help organize replacement labor for the strike. Perkins spoke in the towns of Spangle, and Fairfield, where he implored anyone that filed excuse for military service to “come forth and show us what is really in him.” Residents that had the “country’s welfare at heart,” he cautioned, “would say: here I am ... to harvest the wheat, I am not a slacker in word or act.” Perkins also cautioned the AWIU harvest hands about repercussions, stating that if the strike was carried out, “there shall not be a soup-house counter in all the land for the traitor to put his belly against the coming winter.” His speeches ended with a call to show the AWIU strikers that “there are enough men that have the country and its welfare at heart that will work.” Like most Extension Service speakers, Perkins communicated not only the importance of the wartime harvests, but that it was the community’s patriotic responsibility to safeguard it.²⁰

President Holland sent out his best men to, as Defense Council President Dr Suzzallo put it, “instill a general sense of patriotism in the Palouse farming districts.” Holland promised Governor Lister complete organization by midnight of 18 August, vowing that no expense would be spared in “frustrating the attempts” of the AWIU. Holland sent I.D. Charlton, head of WSC’s Farm Mechanics Division, to western Whitman County on 17 August, returning on 19 August. He spoke with farmers and itinerants in the worker’s camps to impart the “patriotic necessity” of the harvest. Charlton was confident that due to the efforts of the Defense Council, “no difficulties were expected,” and that the atmosphere of patriotic duty was such that “mostly home crews were with the threshers.” Even Whitman County Sherriff H.S. McClure, who sent a deputy to each precinct to “handle any IWW trouble that might arise” reported that none of his deputies encountered trouble of any kind. These reports were typical of the Palouse and surrounding grain producing communities where agricultural agents and Defense Council volunteers organized vehemently against the strike. By the time the 20 August deadline for the general strike passed, all of the momentum had shifted toward the Defense Council and WSC who seemed to have the region relatively free of labor agitation, and the strike well in hand. The presence of Sherriff’s deputies in every Palouse community was another mitigating factor, which no doubt intimidated the already reticent AWIU harvest hands.²¹

Even after their 19 August arrests, Rowan and Madison were confident the strike would continue, regardless of the raids and subsequent confiscation of organizational records and finances. Nils Madison went as far as to say that “they’ll walk off everywhere, 55,000 men if it runs back to the Dakotas.” Rowan was also offended by the branding of him and his fellow Wobblies by the regional media as having acted “unpatriotic and disloyal.” He declared that the IWW were the only real patriots and that the “safety and strength of any country depends on the welfare of the working class.” Regardless of Rowan and Madison’s faith in its success, the 1917 general strike never materialized.²²

In the southeastern portion of the state, there were an estimated 3000 AWIU members in the harvest fields during 1917. Of that number, only seven workers in the entire region answered the call to strike on 20 August. Six of those men worked near the town of St. John and tried to “induce” other harvest hands to join the strike, but without success. In the town of Davenport in Lincoln County, one grain-sack sower employed by Edward Mielke walked off the job to support the strike. With the exception of those seven workers, Palouse Harvest Wobblies never gathered the gumption necessary to strike. The fact that government supported volunteers and overzealous, self-proclaimed patriots combed the Palouse in the days before the strike certainly unsettled the migrant workers. As a result of Defense Council efforts and propaganda, the 1917 Palouse grain harvest succeeded with very little interference from the AWIU. What agitation did occur was inconsequential.²³

On 25 August, the Palouse farm labor situation was investigated by federal labor authorities who concluded that the swift reaction of the Defense Council and WSC effectively neutralized not only the strike, but the AWIU as well. Federal labor agent, B.F. Hunter, travelled to the northwest corner of the Palouse to investigate complaints by farmers about the establishment of IWW camps near the towns of Lamont, St. John, and Sprague. Hunter discovered that farmers in St. John refused to hire itinerant workers and requested “patriotic” farm hands from Colfax, which were promptly received. Agent Hunter felt that as long as the Wobblies camped at St. John, “about 75 of them in all,” continued to leave the government-organized workers “unmolested,” there would be no need to remove them. The farmers obtained the help they needed in spite of the migrant workers who, although available to work, were denied employment because of their union affiliation – real or perceived.²⁴

The Defense Council and WSC both congratulated one another on the rapid and effective response in preempting the strike. President Holland acknowledged the governor’s prompt action, which “effectually settled the [strike] question,” and Gov. Lister replied in kind, stating that the college’s swift response “had much to do with averting the strike.” The business and farming communities of the Palouse overwhelmingly agreed that the region’s labor situation was handled satisfactorily, and throughout the entire harvest, not a single farmer was “handicapped for the want of competent help.” According to the Pullman Chamber of Commerce, the surrounding Palouse countryside organized itself to effectively combat the IWW “element,” thanks mainly in part to the efforts of the Defense Council and WSC. The Defense Council expanded its scope of operations in order to increase the level of “agricultural preparedness” for the 1918 harvest. That preparation included perfunctory raids of IWW offices in Spokane, along with a synchronized effort to mobilize a patriotic workforce to replace itinerants in the Palouse.²⁵

3. Secret service infiltration and sustained resistance

As a result of Rowan’s 1917 general strike threat, Governor Lister, in performing his “responsibility and duty to avoid disorder and destruction of property,” established the Washington State Secret Service. The initial goal of the agency was the infiltration of IWW locals/branches throughout the state by undercover agents who kept tabs on “those who contemplated violence,” thereby enabling the state to forestall acts of labor agitation. Secret Service agents posed as seasonal laborers, joined the IWW rank-and-file membership, and even attained positions as elected officers within some locals. In Spokane, from 1917 to 1919, agent Bart Raperto gained the trust of his

“fellow workers” and then on several occasions had them arrested. He kept meticulous notes on IWW members and faithfully reported all meeting minutes back to Olympia for both Governor Lister and Secret Service chief, C.B. Reed. In March 1918, agent Raperto reported that AWIU Strike Committee members in Spokane intended another strike for the Palouse harvest fields. Just as Governor Lister had suspected, the leaders of the AWIU waited for another time they could again “disturb labor conditions.” Agent Raperto’s undercover operation led to a series of demoralizing raids in Spokane throughout 1918, beginning on 5 April.²⁶

The 5 April 1918 raids on all Spokane IWW halls came without warning. A total of 94 people were arrested during the synchronized downtown sweeps at 507 W. Trent, 328½ W. Main, and 819 W. Riverside. A squad of 24 officers under Sgt. Macdonald arrested 60 Wobblies at the IWW’s Spokane headquarters on Main Avenue. Simultaneous raids at the Workingman’s Palace on Trent Avenue and at the IWW’s Legal Defense Fund headquarters on Riverside Ave. netted another 34 Wobblies. The “most wanted” Wobbly – J.W. Smith – chief organizer and elusive secretary for the AWIU, managed to escape. Agent Raperto reported that Smith planned the next general strike, set for the 1918 harvest. The April raids were an important feature of the Defense Council’s counter-organizing campaign. With the AWIU’s leadership quarantined, the Defense Council was able to wrest a majority of control over farm labor influence in the Palouse region with relative ease, while WSC’s Extension Service mobilized groups of replacement laborers to help farmers guarantee that their grain would be harvested without AWIU agitation. The arrests of the remaining Strike Committee officers provided a perfect complement to the organization of thousands of Washingtonians then being mobilized for the purpose of supplanting AWIU “hobo labor” under the pretext of “reserve labor.” The Defense Council, aided by Washington State College, procured volunteers through various channels to prepare for the 1918 grain harvest while mass arrests in Spokane worked as a preventative measure to keep organizers from traveling south to the harvest fields. As WWI pushed on into 1918 and the spring harvest work was completed, the specter of labor agitation still remained as the late-summer wheat harvest drew near. The Defense Council and the Secret Service began to prepare for another round of preemptive raids to “pinch” remaining AWIU leadership and prevent another strike attempt.²⁷

Beginning in early July, agents reported discussions of yet another Palouse harvest labor strike overheard during private meetings held at various locations around Spokane. Agent Raperto noted that AWIU organizers advised workers to “stay out of the grain fields and to let the harvest go to the rats” if the farmers expected them to work over 10-h days. On 25 August 1918, the orders for another general strike in the Palouse were drafted by the dwindling Wobbly leadership. On 26 August, agent Raperto met with disbarred IWW lawyer and secretary pro tem E. Hofstede, at the Congress Restaurant on Washington Street in an attempt to learn details about the strike plans. During their discussion, Hofstede, who mistakenly trusted Raperto, showed the undercover agent a copy of the strike order hidden in his shoe. The order read:

Let the workers know about it. All wage workers wake up! Now is the time to act! We appeal to you on behalf of the political and economic prisoners. We appeal to all the working class to show their strength and power by united action. HOLD YOURSELVES IN READINESS FOR A FINAL CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE!

Hofstede told Raperto he did not know who signed the strike order, but he was going to do “everything in his power to have it carried out.” Shortly after the meeting,

Raperto notified a police captain to send officers to room 39 of the Plains Hotel where all 3000 copies of the strike order were confiscated and one person, W.E. Hall, was arrested. With all of the strike bulletins confiscated and the only members with knowledge of the strike subsequently arrested, word of the 1918 general strike never reached the ear of a single worker.²⁸

The tactics utilized by the Defense Council were meant to remove as much of the union's membership as possible – not just its leadership. The constant molestation of the AWIU/IWW by government officials and civilian reactionaries harassed the organization to the point of near collapse in 1918. The process of mobilizing replacement labor in the Palouse already began before the start of the harvest season, a process complimented by the series of raids and incarcerations of rank-and-file Wobblies. C.B. Reed, chief of the State Secret Service, stated that as a result of agent Raperto's work, "we [Secret Service] will be able to checkmate any move they [AWIU] make." He also mentioned that the raids put the Defense Council in wonderful shape for the removal of the IWW in the eastern half of the state. The combination of Governor Lister's martial tactics, along with the government organization of women, children, and retired farmers as reserve laborers created an effective barrier for AWIU agitators, stifling plans to disrupt the second wartime harvest. As the "swoops" commenced through the spring and summer of 1918 and IWW leadership was held incommunicado, the Defense Council used the opportunity to replace itinerant workers in the Palouse with groups of "patriotically prompted" harvest laborers.²⁹

4. The 1918 harvest: replacing harvest Wobblies with women and children

To prepare for labor agitation during the 1918 harvest, the Washington State Council of Defense took more proactive measures. The Defense Council expected more strike attempts in 1918 and considering the information received by secret service agents in Spokane, their worries of further farm labor agitation were justified. Many Palouse farming communities even began organizing their own labor reserves to combat the need to hire itinerant laborers and circumvent any possibility of strikes during the upcoming harvest. Volunteers were recruited mostly through "labor drives," held during public rallies and loan drives organized to gather financial and moral support for the war effort. The labor reserves exploited the growing sentiments of nationalism and patriotism by nurturing a system of ritualistic public shaming and humiliation that effectively chastened a number of citizens into volunteering their labor at harvest season. Few Americans wished to face the humiliation of having their name printed in the newspaper next to the word "slacker," or "idler," which was a common punishment for those that refused to volunteer. John Roberts, a retired train conductor from Genesee, Idaho, volunteered his spare time during the harvest to help as a farmhand on W.W. Robertson's threshing crew. Roberts usually went on fishing trips during the summer months, but in 1918, he "demonstrated his desire to help win the war" by working on a farm instead. Self-proclaimed patriots across Washington State accused thousands of their fellow citizens of being "slackers" and/or "idlers." In many cases, those accusations were used to encourage men in cities as well as the farming communities to spend their vacation time in the Palouse to help with the harvest. Men who worked in retail, banking, and office jobs were the prime targets of the Defense Council, who attempted to convince them to do "real men's work" in the fields, while women could be supplied to temporarily replace them at their office jobs. The most common area besieged with these misogynistic bulletins was in Seattle where, according to Defense

Council executive secretary M.P. Goodner, “hundreds of young, active men are doing work which could be performed by women ... the country is calling for these men.”³⁰

Defense Council Farm Labor Committee Chairman and successful Wenatchee farmer A.L. Rogers first suggested the idea of “tapping the unused labor supply” of the agricultural districts, specifically the “underutilized labor” of women and children. He initially presented his plan to Dr Suzzallo and the Defense Council in July 1917, as a reserve measure for agricultural labor preparedness in response to the surge of IWW agitation efforts. The Defense Council originally brushed aside Rogers’ suggestions, but almost immediately after Rowan’s general strike threat, those same detractors showed support for his farm labor preparedness strategy. Rogers, a close friend of WSC President Ernest Holland, asked for the school’s help in facilitating the procurement of women and children as labor replacements through WSC’s Agricultural Extension Service.³¹

In preparation for the 1918 harvests, county agricultural agents performed a detailed census of farming conditions, including farm labor needs. When first introduced in 1914, the “Farm Survey” was the first of its kind conducted in Washington and was an important factor in determining the labor needs of farmers, especially in areas where itinerant labor was relied upon. Once the final results of the census were tallied, Extension Service agents in Whitman County were able to plan for a nearly exact amount of how many laborers would be needed for the season. A labor estimate report created for Whitman County noted that although farmers had already hired, 1262 farm hands in advance, another 2591 would still be needed. Since most migrant workers were hired *after* they arrived to the region, and immediately before the harvest began, it is safe to assume that most of the 1262 pre-hired laborers were area students and area-resident laborers that hired themselves out during the summer months. Extension Service agents hustled to organize the remaining 2591 requested workers through the various clubs and organizations connected to the agricultural college. The survey also determined that many of the wages paid to farm hands the previous season were far below the expected average, a problem that County Agent Leader R.B. Coglon insisted on finding a solution to. Both the USDA and the Department of Labor felt that even in times of war and “patriotic participation,” volunteers needed to be paid a commensurate wage, but only as a means to forestall possible agitation.³²

Agricultural agents worked closely with farmers to determine farm labor wages for the harvest season in hopes of minimizing labor disputes. Extension Service agents made concessions with farmers to establish set wage scales for the various types of labor involved in wheat harvesting. During a 1918 meeting, Whitman County agent F.L. Kennard and Oakesdale farmer W.C. McCoy (chairman of the Farmer-Agent Committee) created a list of wages “slightly higher” than that of the previous year. The meeting also resulted in the establishment of overtime pay and the 10-h workday, both of which marked innovations previously unheard of in regard to Palouse Country farm labor. By most accounts, the predetermined wages were respected and most volunteer farm hands were compensated according to the preset scales. On average the volunteers pay was 25–30 dollars per month, meals included, which consisted of slightly better than meager rations.³³

Due to the high volume of farm labor volunteers and recruits, Extension Service officials realized the usefulness of the program’s ability to organize “non-traditional” forms of harvest labor as means to displace AWIU itinerants. WSC’s Extension Service warned farmers against using “traditional” hired help and encouraged them to utilize the assistance of WSC’s extension service program. It was considered the farmer’s

responsibility to notify the Extension Service if he needed farm labor help, and if he failed to do so within the time allowed, he found himself in the nearest town at harvest time waiting for the next train load of hobo laborers. Posted bulletins suggested to farmers how to cut down the need of hiring labor by, for example, asking farmers themselves to do the work equal to that of “at least one man’s hired labor,” and that neighbors form “community harvest crews.” Washington State Defense Council officials urged Extension Service agents to secure only “local labor sources” and to avoid hiring itinerant workers. The April and August raids in Spokane may have succeeded insofar as leadership arrests, but as the wartime food production emergency remained, so too did the threat of “Harvest Wobbly” agitation. In response to the orders, the Extension Service agreed that only local sources of labor should be drawn upon and only when those sources proved inadequate would “outside” labor forces be utilized. In this definition, “outside labor” involved government-organized volunteers “extracted from the populous communities” outside the target agricultural area, such as Spokane and Seattle.³⁴

Beginning in August 1917, several youth organizations contacted Farm Labor Committee Head A.L. Rogers to offer assistance with the food production emergency. J.H. Piper, the executive head of the Boy Scouts for Western Washington, used his organization’s contacts to enlist the boys of Seattle as volunteer farm laborers and helped mobilize training camps to help “get city boys in condition to do real work on the farm.” Piper’s Boy Scouts were directed to WSC’s Extension Service where they could be trained and utilized for the upcoming harvest. Through his efforts, over 200 “city-boy-scouts” trained at WSC and were subsequently placed with summer harvesting jobs. Washington State College also worked closely with the YMCA. College students were the emphasis of the YMCA’s farm labor employment program, but the Pullman “Y” also extended their employment bureau’s efforts to YMCA centers in Spokane and Seattle in order to recruit elementary and high school-aged volunteers. The young men who volunteered for farm labor drives were organized as the “Boy’s Working Reserve,” while the YWCA mobilized young women into the “Women’s Land Army.” Whitman County agricultural agent J.C. Scott informed WSC President Holland in May, 1918, that the YMCA was “busily engaged” enrolling all available farm labor to be called upon in case of a farm labor emergency.³⁵

The YMCA and Extension Service exploited the youthful volunteers for Defense Council propaganda as children were given an “opportunity to help win the war,” or even “serve in the Army” by volunteering to help bring in the harvest. President Holland endorsed Roger’s plan to have youth volunteers trained to help harvest wheat. In a letter to Governor Lister, Holland said the “boys and girls can render important service in helping to stabilize seasonal labor.” The children proved as an effective means to organize against possible labor agitation during the 1918 grain harvests. The misperception of labor scarcity due to WWI conscription precipitated the events, but as union organizers grew more desperate for agitation in the Palouse, the organization of youth farm labor came to be used for replacement, or scab labor, as opposed to the rather insignificant matter of labor scarcity.³⁶

In March 1918, the first farm labor camps for the young volunteers opened in the Palouse. The purpose of the camps was to properly introduce the “city boy” to the physically demanding world of farm labor. The training camps were established near the WSC campus where the 13–18-year-old participants went through a fairly rigorous conditioning process. They were given old National Guard uniforms and badges and put through two weeks of extensive physical training. The boys were awoken at dawn,

ate breakfast, fed and groomed the horses, and were taught basic maintenance and operation of various implements of farm equipment by WSC employees and volunteers. The boys entered the camps “rather pale and not particularly athletic,” but over the two week period, “a great transformation took place and the boys came out hardened physically.” State Defense Council executive secretary, M.P. Goodner, regarded the Working Reserve as “very necessary”, adding that when “turned out on the farm under good men and women the child laborers made a good minimum of trouble and expense.” Goodner’s statements about the working reserve confirmed the effectiveness of the Defense Council’s unofficial labor replacement program. Goodner initially doubted the practicality of Roger’s plan from the outset, but after he witnessed the results of the reservist’s work, he supported the program indefinitely. Some farmers were dissatisfied with the young farmhands, but many testified to the effectiveness of the reserve labor program.³⁷

Near the town of Steptoe, where more than 100 children were mobilized for the 1918 summer harvest, an area farmer named E. Kreager criticized the high school kids organized to help him harvest 1500 acres of wheat. Kreager complained that school boys “cannot do farm work,” and that they were consumed with loafing and horseplay. However, Kreager’s comment was quickly snubbed by other local farmers who utilized the help of the boys. One of Whitman County’s most successful farmers, Roe Martin, defended their work ethic, stating “he had more experience than anyone in hiring help,” and that the boys did well enough for him to ask several of the children to work for him the following season. Colfax farmer, Harry Roberts, said the boys made fine hired help and “if they were all put to work it would solve the labor problem.” Another Steptoe farmer, B.R. Pratt, stated that some of the best help he ever had on his farm were school boys. In 1918 alone, Washington’s Extension Service program applied the assistance of 860 different Boys and Girls Clubs and 16,153 participants who helped crop over \$1,131,173.00 in net return for selling prices of their labor. Rogers explained that the children were “infinitely helpful” as farm labor problems became more acute and that utilizing the labor of school boys would “do away with the need for transient labor.” His statement represented the progression of the status of replacement laborers from emergency/reserve labor, to union busting scab laborers.³⁸

Ironically enough, the ideological/political loyalty of university presidents Holland and Suzzallo, as well as Governor Lister belonged to the progressive Democrats. All three men held membership cards for the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC), which lobbied for the establishment of federal and state child labor laws to prevent the hiring of those under the age of 18. The NCLC also stressed the creation of more public schools and that public education become compulsory for all American children, even for those expected to perform agricultural labor on a family farm. But, as historian Mark Wyman states, “The concerns of child labor reformers were drowned out by patriotism’s shouts,” and even progressives in positions of power, such as Holland, Suzzallo, and Gov. Lister were caught up in the fervor of the nationalistic hysteria created during WWI.³⁹ The “family farm” in the United States historically utilized the labor power of their children, making agricultural child labor a more socially accepted and economically desired practice. It was the use of women as harvest laborers that was perhaps the most radical aspect of the Defense Council’s AWIU replacement strategy.⁴⁰

Although rare, women working on the farm were not unheard of, but for the expansive wheat farms of the Palouse, the most common laborers were itinerant and male. The placement of women on the farms as a wholesale labor organization technique was

discouraged at almost every level of government. Politicians and farmers alike both preferred to see the labor of idle men, and boys below draft age utilized. Female farm labor was thought of only as a last resort, but as WWI progressed, the notion of women labor on the farms was considered a very real possibility. Between June and September 1918, 89,596 Washington men between the ages of 17 and 45 were registered for conscription, and of that number, 28,280 were furnished for military service. Combined with the volunteers and National Guard units, Washington State supplied “not less than 50,000 men” for war service. With the Palouse harvest in full swing, the Defense Council asked Washington’s women to help. The decision to utilize women’s help on the farms was, in the opinion of Palouse agriculturists and Defense Council officials, a necessary one for confronting the possibility labor scarcity, and labor agitation. This fact was exploited by women’s organizations whose members wanted to take a more active role in the domestic war effort. The Defense Council’s Women’s Work Committee, headed by Ruth Karr McKee, made demands to include women in various war labor industries. Farm Labor Committee Chairman, A.L. Rogers, and Food Supply Committee Chairman, Charles Hebbard, worked with McKee to ensure that women across the state could be induced to volunteer with the harvest. With the help of local newspapers and various patriotic organizations, the Defense Council and WSC reached out to and trained hundreds of women in camps similar to those established for the youth volunteers. It was the experience of Defense Council and WSC officials that most women during WWI rarely needed to be convinced to help and jumped at a chance to assume roles other than domestics, which was what a majority of the female harvest volunteers were accustomed to.⁴¹

Upon hearing of the possibility to utilize female farm laborers, women’s organizations contacted Rogers throughout 1918 and volunteered their services to assist with the coming harvests. In Seattle, Harriet Geithmann offered a squad of 10 girls, all “energetic and patriotic workers,” to help with the Palouse harvest. The girls, all students in the Seattle area, wished to go out on the farms and “do the work of men in Eastern Washington.” Ms Geithmann herself planned to work as a harvest hand with the girls, exclaiming that “all were excited to perform their summer war service that year.” Rogers also received correspondence from Ms Lulie Nettleton, Chairwoman of the Washington State Federation of Women’s Clubs. She informed Rogers that she had dozens of female volunteers ready to help with the upcoming grain harvest. Rogers directed Ms Nettleton to President Holland at WSC who immediately accepted her offer and prepared to involve Nettleton’s various women’s club volunteers in his farm labor training camps. Rogers and Holland lauded the program’s results and praised the usefulness of the female laborers who proved even better workers than their youthful counterparts. Rogers exclaimed the Defense Council’s plan to recruit women on Palouse farms as “practical, patriotic, inspirational and just what the people of the nation need at the present time ... God bless them.” Holland noted the use of women on the farms as the “final organization” in the Defense Council’s labor stabilization efforts.⁴²

In keeping with the wartime theme of volunteerism, Holland received several notices from school employees willing to donate their time to help train the women harvesters. George Severance, Dean of WSC’s Agricultural Science Department, and F.O. Kreager, head of the school’s Elementary Science Department, both arranged to give special training courses to women who wished to take up agricultural work. The newest grain harvest volunteers were taught how to seed, shock, bind, and sow grain sacks. Holland stated that “the women know what a tremendous service they can render

on the farms ... we have an enrollment here of hundreds.” Women trained in Pullman farm labor schools on the university campus for a week, then transported to and from the various farms scattered throughout the Palouse. Their dedication and hard work was praised, and according to A.L. Rogers, the women volunteers would “educate, or shame the ignorant and discontented labor classes into a real sense of duty and citizenship.” For Rogers, the definition of duty and citizenship for the “ignorant working-classes” meant blind allegiance to employer and economy, regardless of one’s work conditions and wages. As a wealthy farm owner himself, Rogers possessed little patience for ideals of economic egalitarianism.⁴³

The mobilization of children and women as farm laborers created a regional labor surplus, and in 1918, the Defense Council criticized the media for reporting labor shortages in the region. Conscription had taken away little of the Palouse labor force by summertime, and the region did not suffer for lack of labor. The Defense Council even released bulletins which stated that reports of labor scarcity in the Palouse actually “hindered” government efforts to place workers on farms. Government officials feared that a sudden proliferation of migrant laborers would create further problems with idleness and vagrancy. Regardless of the many reports stating the opposite, much of the Palouse during WWI maintained, through careful manipulation, a farm labor surplus. Many regional newspaper outlets exaggerated reports of labor shortages in order to maintain a steady overflow of laborers to the Palouse as a means for farmers to better control wages. Migrant workers themselves complained that, “newspapers stated that farmers set wages at \$2.00 per hour, but on arrival you were told they could not afford to pay that amount, or there were no jobs.”⁴⁴

5. “Agricultural Readjustment”

The AWIU in the Palouse nearly collapsed by war’s end, and the Defense Council gave much of this credit to the region’s farmers who employed the hundreds of “patriotic” harvest hands organized through the state’s agricultural college. Farmers that hired laborers “predisposed” to radical tendencies were criticized, especially when the employer failed to give the worker a “proper return” for their labor. In certain cases, the Defense Council felt that employers who suffered the consequences of union agitation due to wage disputes perhaps deserved the unwanted attention. As WWI continued, itinerant workers were lumped together with radical labor movements, regardless of individual proclivities. With a growing, and altogether irrational distrust of hobo laborers, farmers turned to the various forms of volunteer farm hands, such as retired farmers, women, and children. But no matter how effective and helpful those replacements were, they were still considered temporary fixes to wartime problems. As WWI reached its inevitable conclusion in November 1918, a new source of farm labor was made available, and abundantly so. Veterans were returning stateside and the Defense Council quickly expressed its desire to secure employment for them within the state’s agricultural industries.⁴⁵

As the troops made the way back to the United States, the women and children who worked as replacement laborers for the first year and a half of the war were being spirited back to their previous positions in society. “Back-to-School” campaigns were initiated across Washington in order to ensure that children returned to the classroom for the 1918–1919 school year. The Defense Council expected not to see children employed as harvest help as long as there were returning vets that could be hired. The Children’s Bureau and Field Division of the National Council of Defense demanded

that every state ensures the return of children to the classrooms. In a circular issued to Palouse farmers immediately after the 11 November 1918 armistice, the Children's Bureau reminded them that a "false notion of patriotism might prompt employers and parents to urge children to work out of economic necessity." The circular also mentioned that with the cancellation of the wartime food production emergency, it would be a truly patriotic gesture for employers to hire returning soldiers instead. According to Child Welfare Bureau Director, G.B. Clarkson, child labor "drained the elasticity of youth," but more importantly, it limited national output by reducing the number of skilled workers.⁴⁶

While the removal of children for the accommodation of returning troops was important, the removal of women from the harvest fields was an even higher priority. Even though the Women's Land Army was perhaps the most productive group of workers that Palouse farmers utilized during WWI, the chauvinistic attitudes of the male-dominated farm labor workforce did not allow for the continued employment of women during peacetime. The Washington State Defense Council and Washington State College both applauded the patriotic volunteerism displayed by the female farm hands, but with the end of hostilities *after* the harvest season was over, the women were told to return to their pre-wartime occupations and duties. Similar to the removal of the child workers, the women were asked to take a back seat to the returning WWI veterans who would be directed to the state's agricultural districts for employment.⁴⁷

As early as 1917, Defense Council committee members discussed the issue of post-war "agricultural readjustment." Governor Lister and the Defense Council agreed that state employment bureaus would be necessary to provide a system of organizing the placement of unemployed veterans after the war. With the closure of factories engaged in the production of wartime materiel, the "industrial army" of workers engaged in wartime industries found themselves jobless, creating an increased need for government involvement in job placement. Dozens of federal and state employment bureaus were established within Washington State to facilitate the transition from wartime to peacetime occupations. The most common job assignments were agricultural in nature, and many veterans were thrust into varying forms of farm labor, regardless of experience. Beginning in early 1919, thousands of employment bureau registrants from across the nation were sent to farms in Eastern Washington. In order to expedite the glut of farm laborers in the Palouse, the US Employment Bureau asked the assistance of WSC and its Extension Service. It was important that employment bureaus acted purely as a public service and could not profit from or charge a fee to employees for placement. Wage scales were agreed upon in advance by the farmers and the Extension Service in an effort to prevent agitation by the new replacements. As a result of the increased government control over private agricultural enterprise in the Palouse, harvest laborers were paid some of the highest wages the industry had known since before WWI. From 1919 to 1922, Palouse farmhands were paid an average of \$3.50 per day, and in some cases, even travel expenses were included. In some instances, Palouse farm hands were paid as high as \$6.00 a day. As a result, a steady farm labor surplus was the norm during the mid-1920s in southeast Washington. With such abnormally high wages and a labor competition in the region, the AWIU found it increasingly more and more difficult to maintain its membership base in southeast Washington State, thus adding to its collapse.⁴⁸

In January 1919, two months after Germany's surrender, the Washington State Council of Defense ceased to function as an organization. With the end of hostilities, the Defense Council's committee members returned to their previous occupations and

the group was officially disbanded. The preparations made by the Council for the period of agricultural readjustment after the war were followed accordingly, and as a result, state government became more involved within private industries, especially within agriculture. WWI was a turning point in Washington for the relationships among public and private enterprises, and the production emergency was used as a means for the government to take a more active role in the world of business and labor, for better or worse. Perhaps the most crucial aspect to arise from the Defense Council's Palouse activity during WWI was its endorsement of the 10-h workday for farm laborers. Throughout the war, the Defense Council refused to come out in support for either side of the issue. However, after the war, Governor Lister declared his support of the 10-h harvest day and an 8-h day in all other industries.⁴⁹

Another legacy left by reactionary, anti-labor forces in the state government was the Criminal Syndicalism Law which criminalized advocating sabotage to achieve socio-economic or political ends. It was phrased specifically with the word "sabotage" as a direct assault on the preamble of the IWW. Aimed to further harass and disable the IWW, the Criminal Syndicalism Law essentially outlawed membership in the IWW, or any of its locals and affiliated organizations. The law was abused to the point that even lawyers for the IWW were arrested and disbarred for defending clients accused of criminal syndicalism. Governor Lister initially vetoed the law in 1918 because he feared that enforcement would go too far and that it would cause more harm than good. His veto was overridden by the state legislature and enacted into law on 14 January 1919. The law was responsible for 17 years of arbitrary arrests of hundreds of men, women, and children across Washington simply because they joined a union. In some cases, the convicted accused were stripped of their American citizenship. The law was finally repealed by Governor Clarence Martin in 1937. On 14 June 1919, exactly six months after the passage of the Criminal Syndicalism Act he originally vetoed, Governor Ernest Lister died of heart and kidney failure at the age of 49.⁵⁰

To fill the gap left by the Defense Council's retreat back to the civilian world, government organizations like the Department of Labor, Department of Agriculture, and the Extension Service continued to reorganize the agribusiness landscape of the Palouse in both agricultural expansion and labor obtainment. But on the community level, private groups such as the American Legion, Odd Fellows, and the Elks Club continued the Defense Council's wartime mission of demoralizing and criminalizing the IWW, while the IWW continued to resist the onslaught of anti-radical rhetoric and accusations. Those tensions erupted on 19 November 1919 in Centralia, WA, when a violent confrontation during an Armistice Day parade between American Legionnaires and the IWW resulted in the deaths of one Wobbly, four Legionnaires, and a Centralia deputy. WWI provided a unique opportunity for the Defense Council to create an atmosphere of hostility toward the IWW as a means to break the union indefinitely. What began as a system of worker replacement, seen as a covert and benign clampdown during the war eventually spiraled into persistent government suppression, aided by bloody clashes that continued for another decade.⁵¹

Notes

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3. Workman, *The Agricultural Workers Organization*, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22.

4. Preston, *Aliens & Dissenters*, 98.
5. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement*, Vol. 4, 25.
6. Preston, *Aliens & Dissenters*, 104; "Federal Officers Visit Colfax to Secure Evidence – Much Proof Already at Hand," *Pullman Herald*, February 8, 1918.
7. Duffin, *Plowed Under*, 55.
8. "Flow of I.W.W. Checked, Says Deputy," *Seattle Star*, July 4, 1917; Charles Hebbard, letter to Ernest Holland, July 17, 1917, folder 14, box 443, Holland Collection; "Governor Lister Proclamation," folder 812, box 26, Holland Collection.
9. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement*, Vol. 8, 214–224; Foner, *History of the Labor Movement*, Vol. 4, 533–535. Refer to Foner's *History of the Labor Movement* series for further details about events such as the Free Speech Fights, and the Everett Massacre.
10. Preston, *Aliens & Dissenters*, 9; Foner, *History of the Labor Movement*, Vol. 4, 557, 558.
11. Hall, *Harvest Wobblies*, 119.
12. Henry Suzzallo, letter to Herbert Hoover, August 16, 1917, 2H-2-114, Governor Lister Collection.
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20. "Rally Round the Harvest," *Spokesman-Review*, August 18, 1917.
21. Waller, letter to Governor Lister, August 19, 1917, box 16, folder 497, Holland Collection; Henry Suzzallo, letter to Chairman of County Councils of Patriotic Service, August 16, 1917, 2H-2-114, Governor Lister Collection.
22. "Get Other Officers," *Spokesman-Review*, August 20, 1917.
23. *Spokesman-Review*, August 21, 1917, 2; Waller, letter to Governor Lister, August 17, 1917, folder 497, box 16, Holland Collection; Governor Lister, letter to Waller, August 21, 1917, folder 497, box 16, Holland Collection.
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